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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Williams does not deviate from these principles.-3 The court demon-
strates that the continued photocopying of articles from the plaintiff's
journals could result in their ultimate demise, 4 an event which would
retard the progress of science. In the absence of any forthcoming legis-
lationt5 or voluntary agreement between copyright owners and photo-
copiers, it is hoped that courts confronted with the large scale photo-
copying of copyrighted materials will be persuaded to follow Williams
in closely scrutinizing the financial effects of massive reproduction on
the publication involved.
Federal Taxation-SEctioN 482, ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND DE-
DUCTIONS AMONG TAXPAYERS-WHAT IS CONTROL? B. Forman & Co.
v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972).
B. Forman & Co. and McCurdy & Co. operate retail department stores.
In 1958, they caused Midtown to be formed.' Each company retained
50 percent of Midtown's common stock.2 Midtown was to own and
operate a shopping center from which Forman and McCurdy would
lease space for their respective operations.3 During the years 1965, 1966,
and 1967 Midtown borrowed $1 million from each Forman and Mc-
304 (ED. Pa. 1938); Note, supra note 4, at 544. See Sampson & Murdock Co. v.
Seaver-Radford Co, 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905) (dictum); Thompson v. Gernsback,
94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
53. As has been pointed out:
Multiple copying for limited circulation or for gratuitous or scholarly use
is an infringement where there is the finding that the copies may be a substi-
tute for, and therefore in competition with, the copyrighted material.
Note, supra note 37, at 183.
54. Project, supra note 15, at 955, 957.
55. During the infancy of radio broadcasting the court in Jerome H. Remick & Co.
v. American Auto. Accessories, Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925), when forced to con-
strue a copyright statute which made no provision for the broadcasting of copyrighted
musical compositions, observed:
[B]ut, until Congress shall have specifically determined the relative rights of
the parties, we can but decide whether and to what extent statutes covering
the subject-matter generally, but enacted without anticipation of such radical
changes in the method of reproduction, are, fairly construed, applicable to
the situation.
Id. at 411-12.
1. B. Forman & Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir. 1972).
2. Id. at 1148.
3. Id.
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Curdy, executing non-interest bearing notes.4 The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue imputed interest5 on each note at the rate of five per-
cent per annum pursuant to section 4820 of the Internal Revenue Code,
and assessed deficiencies against Forman and McCurdy. The Tax
Court overruled the Commissioner,7 holding that neither taxpayer had
control of Midtown sufficient to satisfy section 482. The circuit court
reversed,8 holding that where two corporations act in concert in form-
ing a third corporation, each taxpayer has sufficient control to come
within the ambit of section 482.
The Commissioner's action represented a departure from the 1945
decision of Lake Erie and Pittsburgh Ry. v. Commissioner9 which held,
on similar facts, that the taxpayers did not have control within the
meaning of section 482. The Commissioner originally acquiesced 0 in
that decision but in 1965 substituted nonacquiescence." This change
of attitude was explained 12 by describing the Lake Erie decision as a
narrow construction of the language of section 482 which ignored the
basic purpose of the section by an interpretation wholly inconsistent
with the broad language contained therein.
This comment will analyze section 482 as it relates to control. More
specifically, it will attempt to determine which decision best character-
izes the jointly owned subsidiary in light of the language and purpose
of section 482.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1149. The Commissioner relied on Treas. Reg. § 1A82-2 (a) (1968), in com-
puting interest.
6. Section 482 reads as follows:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether
or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and
whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion,
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or
among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses.
ENT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 482.
7. B. Forman & Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 912 (1970), afi'd in part, 453 F.2d 1144
(2d Cir. 1972).
8. B. Forman & Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1155 (2d Cir. 1972).
9. 5 T.C. 558 (1945).
10. 1945 CuM. BuLL. 5.
11. 1965-1 CuM. BuILL. 5.
12. Rev. Rul. 65-142, 1965-1 CuM. BuLL. 233.
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Section 482 Scope Problems
Some writers13 have insisted that section 482 is merely redundant and
adds nothing to the existing statutory'14 and judicial remedies.' 5 In
opposition to these observations is the fact that section 482 allows the
Commissioner to apply a consistent policy in the area of arbitrary shift-
ing of income. Section 6116 is particularly effective in situations where
one business entity is without economic substance-a sham. Section 482
presupposes two valid business entities. 17  Section 2691s requires the
acquisition of a business with the primary purpose as tax avoidance.
Section 482 will apply without the necessity of an acquisition and with-
out regard to tax motive.'9 These examples indicate the helpful nature
of section 482 in dealing with tax avoidance situations.
There is an additional problem-what are the consequences when
application of section 482 directly contradicts the specific language of
another section?20  Case law 21 and legal writers2 2 seem to agree that
13. J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON 496 (1968); Hewitt, Section 482-Alloca-
tion of Income Deductions Among Related Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 20M INST. ON FED. TAx.
463 (1962).
14. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 61, 267, 269, 382, 1551.
15. The courts have developed common law concepts in dealing with situations where
active tax avoidance is present. These concepts include: (1) sham, (2) step transac-
tions, (3) business purpose doctrine, (4) net economic effect doctrine, and (5) as-
signment of income. Hewitt, supra note 13, at 490. See also J. R. Land Co. v. Com-
missioner, 361 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1966); Phillip Bros. Chems., Inc., 52 T.C. 240 (1969),
aff'd, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970). But see United States v. Ross, 251 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1966); Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966), acquiesced in
1966-1 CuM. BULL. 7; Chelsea Prods., Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3d
Cir. 1952).
16. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 61.
17. Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952). Contra, Alpha Tank & Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 116 F. Supp. 721 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (dictum).
18. TNT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 269.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) which states in part:
In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the district
director is not restricted to the case of improper accounting, to the case of a
fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a device designed
to reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income, deductions, credits
or allowances. The authority to determine taxable income extends to any
case in which either by inadvertance or design, the taxable income ... is
other than it would have been had the taxpayer in the conduct of his
affairs been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another
uncontrolled taxpayer. (Emphasis supplied).
20. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 351 (non-recognition of gain or loss in certain
situations).
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where a strict application of the Code would result in a distortion of
income, section 482 should be applied to correct that distortion. This
analysis would seem to conform to legislative purpose of the section-
accurate reflection of the income of each taxpayer.23 One writer2 4
has advocated that section 482 should be limited in this regard to cases
involving active tax avoidance and transactions completely devoid
of economic reality. It is clear that the Commissioner is not willing to
limit section 482 in this manner, and it doubtful that the courts will so
interpret the statute in light of the recent cases broadening the scope of
section 482.
Section 482 Requirements
Section 482 requires that three25 elements coexist before a realloca-
tion can be made: (1) two or more organizations, (2) owned or con-
trolled by the same interest, and (3) a finding that reallocation is neces-
sary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect clearly the income
of the taxpayers. It was the intent of Congress26 to give "organizations"
the broadest possible meaning. The courts have generally given effect to
that intent in a variety of different situations. It is safe to conclude
that when two entities arbitrarily shift income among themselves,
they will come under the scrutiny of section 482 regardless of the busi-
ness form utilized.28
21. Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); National Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943).
22. Cooper, Section 45, 4 TAx L. REv. 131, 156 (1949); Plumb & Kapp, Reallocation
of Income and Deductions Under Section 482, 41 TAxEs 808, 827 (1963).
28. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-61 (1943). See also Treas. Reg. § 1A82-
1 (d) (5) which reads as follows: "Section 482 may, when necessary to prevent the avoid-
ance of taxes or to clearly reflect income, be applied in circumstances described in
sections of the Code (such as section 351) providing for non-recognition of gain or
loss."
24. Aland, Section 482: 1971 Version, 49 TAxEs 815, 841 (1971).
25. See Plumb & Kapp, supra note 22, at 810.
26. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 24 (1933); S. RED. No. 558, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 29 (1933).
27. The section has been applied in situations involving two corporations, Commis-
sioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); a partnership and a corpora-
tion, Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), acquiesced in 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 2,
aff'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953); a corporation and sole
proprietorship, Hall v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961); a corporation and an
exempt foundation, Stevens Bros. & Miller Hutchinson Co, 24 T.C. 953 (1955), ac-
quiesced in 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 5.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (1) which defines organization to "include any organiza-
tion of any kind, whether it be a sole partnership, a partnership, a trust, an estate, an
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The nature and definition of control will be discussed extensively in
a later section, but it should be emphasized that the presence of control
alone is not sufficient for the application of section 482. It is only when
this control is present along with some distortion of income that sec-
don 482 is activated.
The transaction between the two controlled entities must result either
in an evasion of taxes or in a distortion of income.29 Originally, it was
thought that some intentional tax avoidance was necessary, but later
cases 0 indicated that completely inadvertent action could bring the
transaction under the scope of section 482. In Ballentine Motor Com-
pany,3 the court suggests that the Commissioner would have greater
latitude when dealing with a situation where there is a complete lack of
business purpose.
Procedurally the Commissioner has the advantage. His determination
will "be set aside only if it is shown to be arbitrary and capricious, and
the taxpayer has the burden of proving it so." 32 Because of this ad-
association, or a corporation . . ., irrespective of the place where organized, where
operated, or where its trade or business is conducted...
29. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1 (c) which states in part:
In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the dis-
trict director is not restricted to the case of improper accounting, to the
case of a fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a
device designed to reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income, de-
ductions, credits, or allowances. The authority to determine true taxable
income extends to any case in which by inadvertance or design the taxable
income . . .is other than it would have been [if the transactions were of
arm's length].
30. Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Tennessee Life Ins.
Co. v. Phinney, 280 F.2d (5th Cir.), aff'd, 364 U.S. 914 (1960); Simon J. Murphy Co.,
22 T.C. 1341 (1955), rev'd, 231 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1956); Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Com-
missioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
31. 39 T.C. 348, aff'd, 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1962). See also Aland, supra note 24, at
820-27 where the author analyzes three cases dealing with intercompany pricing and
concludes, "it seems fair to state that the Woodward Governor, PPG Industries and
Lufkin Foundry cases have imposed severe restraints on the Commissioner's power
to substitute his judgment under the guise of Section 482 allocation for that of tax-
payers in the inter-company pricing area where tax avoidance is not present." Id. at 827.
32. Plumb & Kapp, supra note 22, at 830. See, e.g., Hall v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d
82 (5th Cir. 1961); G.U.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941); Con-
nery Coal & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 1018 (7th Cir. 1931); Seminole Flavor Co.,
4 T.C. 1215, 1228 (1945); National Sec. Corp., 46 B.T.A. 562, 564 (1942), aff'd, 137
F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943); Briggs-Killian Co., 40 B.T.A.
895 (1939); Welworth Realty Co., 40 B.T.A. 97 (1939). See also Young & Rubican,
Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233, 1244 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Spicer Theatre, Inc., 44 T.C.
198, 206 (1964), aff'd, 346 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1965); Hamburgers York Rd., Inc., 41 T.C.
821,835 (1964).
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vantage, the courts have required the Commissioner to give advance
notice, usually in the deficiency notice, that he will rely on section
482.23
What 482 Does Not Do
Generally speaking, it is said that section 482 does not allow the
Commissioner to do three things: (1) disregard separate business en-
tities if they are being used for a bona fide business purpose,4 (2)
disallow deductions,8 5 and (3) create income3 6
When a business entity may lack a business purpose, an analysis is
generally made under section 61. Section 482 assumes the validity of
the corporate entities. The second proposition-that section 482 does
not disallow deductions-can be somewhat misleading. In the usual
section 482 case, the Commissioner will be attempting to allocate to or
from a loss corporation. This corporation will not be able to take ad-
vantage of the deduction and in this sense the Commissioner has denied
a deduction. The third area has spawned a tremendous amount of con-
troversy. The Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co.Y7 case involved the lease
of certain equipment to a corporation owned and controlled by the same
interests as the taxpayer. The Commissioner attempted to impute rental
income to taxpayer without a correlative adjustment to the other cor-
poration. The court held 3  this to be a creation of income not within
the power granted by section 482.
33. See, e.g., Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965);
United States v. First Sec. Bank, 334 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Chelsea
Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952); Ross v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.
1942).
34. W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968).
35. Hypotheek Land Co. v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1952); General
Indus. Corp, 35 B.T.A. 615, 617 (1937). See also Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
291 F.2d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 1961); A.G. Nelson Paper Co., 3 CCH TAx CT. Mum. 914,
916 (1944).
36. Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acquiesced in 1951-1 GuM. BUL. 3, explained,
Rev. Rul. 67-79, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 117. See also E.C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159, 175-77 (1940),
acquiesced in 1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 7, aff'd (revd) on other grounds, 128 F.2d 4 (5th
Cir. 1942); Eustice, Tax Problems Arising from Transactions Between Affiliated or
Controlled Corporations, 23 TAx L. Rav. 451, 489-92 (1968); Seieroe & Gerber, Section
482-Still Grocwing at the Age of 50, 46 TAxEs 893, 902-04 (1968); Note, Interest-Free
Loans and Section 482-Creation of Income?, 9 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 509 (1968).
37. 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cit. 1940).
38. Id. at 510.
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Smith-Bridg-nian & Co.a9 was the first case to deal with interest-free
loans. Here the subsidiary loaned the parent corporation money with-
out charging interest. Again the Commissioner attempted to impute
interest income to the taxpayer. The court rejected the Commissioner's
attempt, holding 40 that the Commissioner could not create income. In
Revenue Ruling 67-7941 the Commissioner attempted to explain the
case by suggesting that the reason for the decision was his failure to
make a correlative adjustment. In Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,42 the court held that the Commissioner's failure to make the
adjustment was a factor to be considered, but not necessarily dispositive
of the case. The court in Forman acknowledged these cases but stated
that:
To the extent that the above cases cited by the taxpayers may
be read as holding that no interest can be allocated under 482 under
the facts of this case, they are not in accord with economic re-
ality, or with the declared purpose of section 4824
In 1968, the Commissioner promulgated new regulations" under section
482 which permit the imputation of interest. The Forman court held
that these regulations "are entirely consistent with the scope and purpose
of § 482" "' and therefore must be followed. Thus, the Commissioner
has seemingly gained added strength in this area, at least in transactions
involving interest-free loans.
Legislative History
The legislative history of section 482 will be dealt with only insofar
39. 16 T.C. 287 (1951).
40. Id. at 294.
41. 1967-1 CuM. BuLL. 117.
42. 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
43. 453 F.2d at 1156.
44. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(d), 1.482-2, T.D. 6952, 1968-1 CUM. BU=. 218. In 1962
the House passed a Bill that would have set up definitions of arm's length standard,
the Senate deleted this provision because:
the objectives of section 6 of the Bill as passed by the House can be ac-
complished by amendment of the regulations under the present section 482.
Section 482 already contains broad authority to the Secretary of the Treasury
or his delegate to allocate income and deductions.
H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1962). This would add strong support
for the Forman court's decision on this point.
45. 453 F.2d at 1156.
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as it illustrates the Congressional policy considerations in the enactment
of that section 46
During World War I excess profits taxes were first levied, and as a
result corporations began inter-company transactions that resulted in
tax losses to government. To combat this situation the Treasury, with-
out benefit of statutory authority, issued regulations that provided for
consolidated returns. 47
In 1918 Congress passed a provision4 that allowed the Commissioner
to consolidate returns of affiliated taxpayers. The provision's effect was
described in the Senate Report as one that would "prevent evasion
which cannot be successfully blocked in any other way." 49 It would
seem that at this point the clear intention of Congress was to prevent
the deliberate avoidance of taxes through arbitrary transactions between
affiliated taxpayers.
In the 1928 Act, 0 the section was changed from a consolidation sec-
tion to one that allowed the Commissioner to "distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income or deductions." 51 The purpose of this change
was to broaden the section in order to provide adequate protection for
the government from arbitrary action by the taxpayer that could erode
the tax base. 2
The 1934 Act' added the word "organizations" to the statute. The
House Report-4 stated that although it was not thought to change the
present law, it would remove any ambiguity that might tend to limit
the scope of the section. Again it is apparent that Congress was con-
cerned that a narrow reading of the statute would lead to an erosion of
the tax base.
In 1944 Congress amended 55 the section to include "gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances." Again the announced intention
46. The following articles rigorously develop section 482: Cooper, Section 4;, 45
TAX L. Rav. 331 (1949); Eustice, Tax Problems Arising from Trarnsactions Between
Affiliated or Related Corporations, 23 TAX L. REv. 451, 481-523 (1968); Plumb & Kapp,
Reallocation of Income and Deductions Under Section 482, 41 TAXES 809 (1963);
Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482-Still Growing at the Age of 50, 46 TAXES 893 (1968);
Sherman, A Case History of Section 45, 29 TAXES 13 (1951).
47. Spaeth, Section 482-Past and Future, 47 TAXES 45 (1969).
48. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 240(a), 40 Star. 1081.
49. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1918) (Emphasis supplied).
50. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Star. 806.
51. Id.
52. H.R. RE. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1928).
53. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 45, 48 Star. 695.
54. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
55. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 128(b), 58 Stat. 47.
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was to make sure that other section changes would not have the tend-
ency of narrowing the scope of section 45 by implication." The next
manifestation of Congressional intent came in 1948 when the House
Ways and Means Committee discussed the possibility of limiting the
section to deliberate distortions.57 That provision was never reported
out of committee. This refusal to limit the section gives rise to the
negative implication that Congress intended the Commissioner to have
broad authority in maintaining the tax base. Further, it would seem to
imply a ratification of Regulation 86 of 1934 which specifically applied
the section to cases of inadvertence."
The 1954 Act enacted section 482 in essentially the same form as
section 45 of the 1939 Act and no significant change was contemplated
until 1962. The House Bill that year included amendments to section
482 that would have defined arms-length transactions. The Senate"9
deleted that section from the Bill by stating that it was their belief that
the present section gave the Commissioner sufficiently broad powers to
promulgate regulations in this area. This invitation was accepted by
the Commissioner and resulted in the 1968 regulations. 60 Underlying
this action is the implicit Congressional understanding of section 482,
that the scope of the Commissioner's power is very broad.
As can readily be seen by the foregoing discussion, Congress has con-
sistently approached section 482 with the idea that it was a powerful
tool enabling the Commissioner to prevent inter-company transactions
that fail to reflect accurately the income of the respective companies; and
Congress has consistently rebuked efforts to narrow its provisions. Con-
gress did not intend that a corporation could escape the provisions of
section 482 by organizing a joint venture in such a manner that income
could be arbitrarily shifted from one entity to another. The Supreme
Court in United States v. Donruss Co.,"- recognized this Congressional
intent, holding that a fair reading of the statute could effectively elimi-
nate the evil of arbitrary shifting of income that reduces tax revenues.
The Fonman court also believed that a fair reading of the statute could
effectuate the underlying Congressional intent. 2
56. H.R. R. No. 871, 78th Cong, 1st Sess. (1943).
57. J. SEDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExCSs PROFITS
TAX LAWS 1475 (1954).
58. See Spaeth, supra note 47, at 49.
59. See note 45 supra & accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
62. 453 F.2d at 1156.
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Nature of Control
One of the requirementss of section 482 is that the two business en-
tities be "owned or controlled. . . by the same interests." " Clearly,
"owned or controlled" is limited by the "same interests." However, in
applying this provision the courts sometimes stray from a rigorous con-
struction and talk of the separate elements as if they are one. In For-
man, the court addressed the question of control when the real issue
was determining what the "same interests" were. As soon as the court
found that McGurdy and Forman were the same interest, it necessarily
follows that the two entities were owned and controlled by them.
The first point of analysis turns on the phrase "owned or controlled."
Seemingly, the obvious intent of Congress in using the disjunctive "or"
was to allow allocation whenever either of the two elements were
present. Early cases ignored that interpretation and required both ele-
ments to co-exist.0 5 It was soon realized that the evil sought to be cured
could flourish in a situation where control without ownership existed. 6
The General Counsel 7 has described "control" as "not necessarily
limited to strict legal control, but to a 'genuine and real control actually
exercised . . . .' Obviously the control intended is, however, not that
of the stock or shares of the entities owning the business . . . but con-
trol of the trades or businesses themselves." Thus, as early' as 1928 it
was recognized that it was the substance of the control and not the
form that would satisfy the statute. But as late as 1951 the courts 8 were
still refusing to imply inferred or apparent control when not coupled
with ownership. As the underlying purpose of section 482 became
resognized by the courts' 9-to put controlled taxpayers on parity with
uncontrolled taxpayers-the courts began making the necessary infer-
63. See notes 26-32 supra & accompanying text.
64. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 482.
65. See Hewitt, supra note 13, at 471.
66. Id.
67. VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 138 (1928).
68. John L. Denning & Co, 180 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1950); Nelson Paper Co., 3 CCH
TAx Cx. MEm. 914 (1944).
69. See Tennessee Life Ins. Co. v. Phiney, 280 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 364 U.S.
914 (1960); Simon J. Murphy Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 639 (6ih Cir. 1956);
V & M Homes, Inc., 28 T.C. 1121 (1957), aft'd, 263 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1959). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1 (b) (1) where it states in part:
The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity
with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard
of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property
and business of a controlled taxpayer.
1972]
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ences and recognizing apparent control. In Grenada Industrie7 ° the
businesses were divided among several trusts and individuals. The court
held that even though the ownership was divided among several in-
terests, "the actual control at all times material . . . was really exer-
cised by J.A. Goodman, L.L. Goodman, Kobin and Barskin." 71 In Hall
v. Commissioner,7 2 Hall, Sr. owned a sole proprietorship and Hall, Jr.
owned substantially all the stock of a corporation. The court held that
Hall, Sr. was in actual control of the corporation so that an allocation
could be made to his sole proprietorship. Although there was a vigor-
ous dissent,73 one commentator 4 suggests that the Congressional purpose
was to stop arbitrary transactions that reduced taxes, and that purpose
was best satisfied by the attribution made in Hall.
The trend is apparent; courts are becoming more willing to find
"control" when de facto control exists. The above cases illustrate the
courts' willingness to find control by the "same interests" when family
relationships are involved. Some writers76 have suggested that the statute
was purposely vague to allow flexibility in the administration of the
section. As one early case76 pointed out, had Congress meant to say
"controlled by the same persons" it could have done so. The clear impli-
cation is that persons and interests are not the same thing.
It seems that a fair interpretation of "same interests," in light of the
above discussion, would include the situation where two corporations
combine in a joint venture for their mutual benefit. There seems to be
no greater force in the argument that family member, as in the Hall
case, or that trusts for various individuals, as in Grenada, are the "same
interests" than in the argument concerning the two corporations in the
Forman case. It is clear that the Lake Erie decision was an anomaly in
the law. It allowed two corporations to escape the purpose7 7 of Con-
70. 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819
(1953).
71. Id. at 254.
72. 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961).
73. Id. at 87.
74. See Hewitt, supra note 13, at 475.
75. See Plumb & Kapp, supra note 22, at 811 where the author suggests that "[t]he
words 'directly or indirectly' imply at least that beneficial ownership, through trust,
partnership or holding company will be regarded as the same as ownership of legal
tide." Eustice, supra note 36, at 451 noted that Congressional intent must have been
to provide flexibility in the section, otherwise Congress would have inserted specific
percentage requirements as they did in § 269 and 1551.
76. Rishell v. Phonograph Co., 2 B.T.A. 229, 232 (1925).
77. See notes 47-62 supra & accompanying text.
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gress and erode the tax base with arbitrary transactions when a fair
reading of the statute would prohibit this conduct. The court in For-
man recognized the realities of the relationship and found that two
corporations, acting in concert in a joint transaction, were the "same
interests," and therefore within the scope of the section 482.7s
One writer has suggested that the finding of arbitrary transactions
would necessarily mean that sufficient common control exists.19 Other
writers suggest that this type of reasoning will render the control re-
quirement meaningless8 ° It is not necessary to go this far. Joint par-
ticipation in the venture clearly rendered Forman and McGurdy the
"same interests"; accordingly it follows that they have control of the two
or more businesses.
It has been seen that the basic underlying policy of section 482 is
maintenance of a parity between controlled and uncontrolled taxpayers,
so that the tax base will not be eroded. Stated differently, section 482
was designed to eliminate the artificial and arbitrary shifting of income
and deductions so as to reduce tax liability. Given the above policy
bases, it would seem unreasonable to allow two corporations to frustrate
the Congressional purpose simply by incorporating a jointly owned
subsidiary. One question remains-how many entities must own a cor-
poration before it would be exempt from section 482? It seems that so
long as owners are acting in concert for their mutual benefit, and at the
same time arbitrarily shifting accounts, they should be considered the
"same interests" for the application of section 482. There is no reason
to allow some interests to "hide" income while making the less ad-
venturous pay the full bill.
78. 453 F.2d at 1155.
79. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 139. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (3) which
states that a presumption of control will arise whenever there has been arbitrary
shifting.
80. Seieroe & Gerber, supra note 36, at 898 where the authors describe the interaction
of the presumptions:
As the Regulations provide, control will be presumed if income or deduc-
tions have been arbitrarily shifted. Seemingly, if income or deductions
have been 'shifted,' the shifting has been arbitrary. Whether there has been
a shifting would seem to hinge on the trier's view of where the income or
deductions properly belonged in the first instance. Therefore, if an allo-
cation is indicated, it would follow that there had been a shifting which
was arbitrary which gives rise to the presumption of the requisite control,
thereby making the allocation permissible.
With this trend, requisite control would be found without difficulty in
cases involving jointly owned subsidiaries such as considered in Lake Erie
&' Pittsburgh Railway Co.
1972]
